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Abstract 
According to proponents of doxastic deontologism, what is responsible belief? In this 
paper, we consider two proposals. Firstly, that responsible belief is blameless belief (a 
position we call DDB) and, secondly, that responsible belief is praiseworthy belief (a 
position we call DDP). We begin by offering some considerations in favour of DDB over 
DDP and then show that recent arguments in favour of DDP (offered mostly by 
Weatherson 2008) do not go through. We thus conclude that the deontologist should 
maintain that doxastic responsibility is a concept about freedom from appropriate blame.  
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Let Doxastic Deontologism (DD) be the following thesis: 
 
 DD:  S is justified in believing that p iff S believes that p responsibly. 
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The idea behind DD is that we are under certain doxastic obligations (prohibitions, 
permissions) and that we should understand the justification of belief in terms of our 
compliance with them. If we do comply with them, we believe responsibly. 
 But what is it to believe responsibly? That is a superlatively difficult question. But 
let us consider a couple of conflicting proposals that have been put forward in the 
literature, in order to (at least, partially) elucidate the concept of responsible belief. Let us 
formulate the thesis that responsible belief should be cashed out in terms of 
praiseworthiness, the thesis of Doxastic Deontologism as Praiseworthiness (DDP), as 
follows: 
 
DDP: S responsibly believes that p iff S is praiseworthy for believing that 
p. 
 
And let us distinguish DDP from the more standard deontological view of doxastic 
responsibility, which is cashed out in terms of blamelessness, a view we might dub 
Doxastic Deontologism as Blamelessness (DDB): 
 
DDB: S responsibly believes that p iff S is blameless for believing that p. 
 
In this paper, we argue that if DD is true, then DDB (rather than DDP) is true, i.e. that 
doxastic deontologism should be formulated in terms of blamelessness and not 
praiseworthiness. We also attempt to refute some arguments in favour of construing DD 
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in terms of praiseworthiness, mainly those proposed (or at least inspired) by Brian 
Weatherson‟s recent article “Deontology and Descartes‟ Demon”1. 
 Throughout this paper, we will assume with Weatherson that DDP and DDB are 
mutually exclusive. Let us briefly explain why. It seems that if one is praiseworthy for 
believing that p, then one is also blameless for believing that p, but that if one is 
blameless for believing that p, one is not thereby praiseworthy for believing that p. That 
is, in certain circumstances one is responsible
2
 for holding some belief B, while being 
neither blameworthy nor praiseworthy for holding B. DDB has it that in those 
circumstances we believe responsibly, whereas DDP has it that in such circumstances we 
do not believe responsibly. The views do not only contradict each other, they also seem 
to be the only games in town. Any other option, such as the view that responsible belief is 
blameworthy belief, seems absurd. 
 This paper is organized as follows. In section II, we put forward two 
considerations that favour DDB over DDP: first, that if the doxastic domain is relevantly 
analogous to the domain of action, DDB is more plausible than DDP, and, second, that 
the highly plausible view of epistemic conservatism fits DDB much better than DDP. In 
                                               
1
 Brian Weatherson, “Deontology and Descartes‟ Demon,” The Journal of Philosophy 
105.9 (September 2008), 540-69. Page references will be to this article, unless indicated 
otherwise. Unfortunately, nowhere in his article, Weatherson gives a precise formulation 
of the view he advocates, but DDP seems to be a correct representation of his main thesis. 
Here are some important formulations of his view: “justification is a kind of 
praiseworthiness, and (…) praise is more relevant to epistemic concepts than blame” (p. 
540); “justification is a kind of praiseworthiness, not a kind of blamelessness” (p. 453); 
and “a belief‟s being justified is not a matter of it being blameless, but a matter of it being 
in a certain way praiseworthy” (p. 569). 
2
 Notice that the phenomenon of being responsible for -ing should not be confused with 
that of -ing responsibly. The former merely implies that one is accountable, that is, the 
proper subject of reactive attitudes, for -ing, whereas the latter also implies that one is 
not blameworthy (and, hence, either merely blameless or also praiseworthy). 
 4 
sections III – V, we discuss three arguments that might be thought to count in favour of 
DDP. In section III we respond to the idea that DDP enables us to deal with the familiar 
problem generated from the fact that doxastic attitudes are, at least generally, not under 
our direct voluntary control. In section IV we discuss the claim that DDP is necessary to 
account for all our intuitions in the New Evil Demon case. And in section V we consider 
an argument to the effect that DDB, in conjunction with three principles a doxastic 
deontologist is bound to accept, leads to a contradiction. We attribute the arguments in 
sections IV and V to Weatherson, but since it is unclear whether Weatherson 
countenances the consideration put forward in section III, we take it as being merely 
inspired by some of what he says on the matter. We show that none of these arguments 
stand up to scrutiny. 
 
II. Two Considerations In Favour of the Standard View 
 
To kick off the discussion, let us consider why deontological doxastic justification is 
normally interpreted in terms of blamelessness. We think this is because DD is mainly 
considered to be a thesis about doxastic permissibility. As such, it is an “innocent till 
proven guilty” view, in the sense that one believes responsibly just in case, as it were, one 
does not break the doxastic law (that is, does not violate a doxastic obligation). Thus, if a 
belief that p is permissible, it is justified (since it is responsible). As John Pollock puts it: 
 
When we ask whether a belief is justified, what we want to know is whether it is 
all right to believe it. Justification is a matter of “epistemic permissibility”.3 
                                               
3
 J. Pollock “Epistemic Norms,” Synthese 71.1 (1987), 61. 
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If DD is best conceived in such a way, then it stands to reason that it would be a thesis 
about blameworthiness and not praiseworthiness, since only the former concept can 
adequately capture what it is wrong to believe (the latter tells us what it is good to 
believe). But why think that DD is about permissibility? It is most unclear why many 
prominent doxastic deontologists think it is and it is hard to think of any plausible 
argument in favour of this idea. In what follows, we will, therefore, provide two 
considerations that count in favour of DDB independently of whether responsible belief 
is a matter of doxastic permissibility. 
 First, one might think that one‟s accounts of responsibility for action and 
responsibility for belief should be structurally similar, unless we have good reason to 
think that there are important differences between responsibility for action and 
responsibility for belief. But to act responsibly is clearly not to perform a praiseworthy 
action. Imagine Max, a teacher, who is not particularly enthusiastic about his job, 
nevertheless decides to meet all his professional duties by preparing and teaching his 
classes, correcting the students‟ exams, and so forth. And imagine also that Max decides 
not to do anything that, as a teacher, he is not required to do. Thus, he corrects the exams 
within the required period, but not as quickly as he can, he prepares his classes 
sufficiently, but not as thoroughly as he could, etc. It seems that in doing all this, Max 
acts responsibly, although there is nothing particularly praiseworthy about what he does. 
But if this is correct, then why should we think that things are different in the doxastic 
domain? Of course, there are important dissimilarities between the two domains; for 
instance, in opposition to action, belief is widely thought not to be under our direct 
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voluntary control. But how do these differences affect the way in which we are 
responsible for our actions and beliefs? How does it follow from the differences between 
action and belief that to believe responsibly is to be praiseworthy for one‟s belief? As far 
as we know, no such argument has been offered in the literature and we cannot think of 
any either.
4
 
 A second consideration in favour of DDB over DDP is that it accords with 
epistemic conservatism (EC) much better than DDP. EC is, roughly, the view that so long 
as S‟s belief that p is undefeated, S is entitled to believe (or justified in believing) that p. 
A bit more precisely, the point is that if EC and DD are true, then DDB seems much more 
likely to be true than DDP. This is simply because if it is possible to have a justified 
belief only on the grounds that it is undefeated, then praiseworthiness cannot be a 
necessary condition for believing responsibly, since (under DD) one is justified just in 
case one believes responsibly, and one is not worthy of praise simply for having an 
undefeated belief. However, one may well be blameless for having an un-praiseworthy 
belief, and if one can responsibly believe that p just by being blameless, and thus (under 
DD) be justified in believing that p, one can also be justified in believing that p merely on 
the grounds that the belief has not been defeated. Thus, DDB (unlike DDP) is perfectly 
consistent with EC, so if EC is true and DD is true, then DDB is also true, again, 
assuming that one of DDB and DDP is true if DD is. 
                                               
4
 Perhaps there is a way in which the doxastic voluntarism problem bears on this issue. In 
section III, we consider one argument that is related to the topic of doxastic involuntarism 
and that might be thought to count in favour of DDP over DDB. 
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 As Kevin McCain rightly argues in a recent paper
5
, EC has many virtues, virtues 
which transfer to DDB in virtue of the proximity of EC and DDB. Certainly, they are 
advantages that DDP, in its inconsistency with EC, must find another way to appropriate 
and it is most unclear how it might do so. EC‟s main appeal, according to McCain, is that 
it allows us to respond to the skeptical challenge found in Descartes‟ Meditations.6 The 
challenge is that, since we have no better reason to believe that there is an external world 
than to believe that we live in a world in which an Evil Demon systematically cons us 
into thinking that there is, we should not believe that there is an external world. The 
conservatives‟ response is to deny the implicit premise that if one‟s reasons for believing 
that p are no better that one‟s reasons for believing that not-p, then we are not justified in 
believing that p. So, given that we believe that there is an external world, we are justified 
in so doing until our belief is defeated. The thought behind conservativism is that, in view 
of the threat from scepticism, we had better set the standards for what counts as a 
justified belief as low as possible. It is natural to suppose that DDB is more faithful to 
that thought than is DDP. 
 These two considerations do not demonstrate or show that DDB is true, but they 
clearly count in its favour. This means that we should accept DDB, unless there are good 
reasons for accepting DDP that trump or balance the arguments in favour of DDB. We 
                                               
5
 Cf. Kevin McCain, “The Virtues of Epistemic Conservatism,” Synthese 164.2 (2008), 
185-200. 
6
 The other virtues McCain attributes to EC are that it can deal with the intuition that 
when we are revising our beliefs we need to do so in a piecemeal fashion - we cannot 
revise all of our beliefs at once; it explains why our spontaneously formed memory 
beliefs are justified, even if we have no independent evidence for them; it can 
accommodate the thought that a belief based on good evidence may still be justified even 
if S has forgotten what that evidence is; and it can deal with Stewart Cohen‟s famous 
“problem of easy knowledge”; see, for instance, his “Why Basic Knowledge Is Easy 
Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70.2 (2005), 417-30.  
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now turn to discuss three putative advantages of DDP over DDB, arguing that they do not 
stand up to scrutiny. 
 
III. Praiseworthiness and Control 
 
Let us first deal with the idea that DDP can handle the voluntarism problem for 
deontologism. The problem is that it seems that, since we do not have voluntary control 
over our beliefs, and „ought‟ implies „can‟, we cannot be said to have doxastic 
responsibility. However, it might be true that praiseworthiness „outruns‟ voluntary 
control, such that DDP solves the voluntarism problem. Consider Weatherson‟s example 
of a Cricket captain, who comes up with a particularly imaginative field placing in the 
course of a test match. While we may want to praise the captain here, we do so despite 
thinking that what he did was not something he had control over. After all, claims 
Weatherson, coming up with the particular field placement is hardly something the 
captain can set out to do. And we deem this Cricket captain more praiseworthy than his 
colleague, who works equally hard, but who does not come up with such an imaginative 
field placement. So if we can justly attribute praise to S for -ing, irrespectively of 
whether or not -ing is something S has voluntary control over, then DDP is immune 
from the voluntarism problem, since the claim is that deontological doxastic judgements 
– that is, judgments about some person S‟s doxastic attitude A that imply one‟s holding S 
responsible for having or maintaining A – are solely about praise. However, for at least 
three reasons we do not think this appeal to praiseworthiness helps deontologism with 
respect to the voluntarism problem. 
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 1. First, in order for the reply to go through we need to take being imaginative to 
be analogous to being in belief states, such that we have no direct voluntary control over 
either. However, we do seem to have indirect voluntary control over our doxastic 
attitudes, and probably over our acts of imagination too. We can train ourselves to be 
more critical of things like gossip and the word of self-bequeathed authorities, for 
example; we might also train ourselves to be more imaginative: perhaps by engaging with 
imaginative people and their work, or by simply trying to conceive of imaginative 
solutions to everyday problems (even if one does not act on them), for instance. 
According to Alston, the fact that deontologism needs to be „grounded‟ on our indirect 
control means that it has to be a thesis about blamelessness. This is because, as 
Weatherson himself notes, in such a formulation what we are responsible for are not 
particular doxastic tokens, but rather certain actions such as training oneself to be less 
credulous. But of course, as Alston continues and Weatherson does not, this does not 
mean that we cannot be held to blame for having particular doxastic tokens. This is 
because blame supervenes on requirement in two ways, as Alston puts it: 
 
First, and most simply, one is to blame for failing to do something required. But 
second, one is to blame for the obtaining of some fact if that fact would not have 
obtained if one had not behaved in some manner for which one is to blame in the 
first sense, that is, for doing something forbidden or failing to do something 
required.
7
 
 
Of course, the same can be said for praise here that can be said for blame, so we need not 
take this point as telling us anything that will settle the question of whether we are to 
                                               
7
 William P. Alston, Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1989), 140. 
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construe deontological doxastic justification in terms of praise or blame. What is 
important, however, is that we can talk of praise or blame for particular doxastic tokens 
without needing to „outrun‟ voluntary control, since we can base such judgements on the 
indirect doxastic (or imaginative) control we do have. So our first worry with this 
argument in favour of DDP is that it provides a solution to a problem that already has an 
equally plausible solution. And only if Weatherson‟s solution is more convincing than 
this one, can Weatherson‟s account of our praising the captain for his imaginative field 
placement count in favour of DDP. 
 Once we bring the notion of indirect voluntary control into play here, we can see 
the example which Weatherson offers in quite a different way than he does. Certainly, we 
can now wonder whether the praise we are inclined to ascribe to the Cricket captain is not 
in fact due to his capability to train his imagination, his capability to train himself to use 
its results, and/or his capability to engage in the matter at all. It might also be the case 
that our attributions of praise when it comes to the imagination are partly a function of 
our thinking that the act of imagination in question yields a particular result or arrives at a 
propitious moment - would we still praise the Cricket captain if his field-placing involves 
a strong element of risk in a tight, tense game when one needs to eliminate risk as much 
as possible, for instance? The ability to engage one‟s imagination at appropriate times 
may well be something we do have at least indirect control over. The point is that our 
attribution of praise when it comes to the imagination may be over-determined by a 
variety of factors, many of which seem to involve, at least indirect, voluntary control.  
 2. Second, there seem to be two different kinds of praise. On the one hand, we can 
praise some person S for -ing (where S‟s -ing is to include both S‟s actions and S‟s 
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being in certain states), if we want to express the fact that S‟s -ing is something we 
value or consider good, without holding S responsible for -ing. In this sense, I might 
praise Miranda for her beauty, without holding her responsible for it, and I may praise my 
recently bought Chevrolet for its speed. This sort of praise, if that is really what it is, 
ought to be clearly distinguished from the kind of praise usually classified as what Peter 
Strawson calls a „participant reactive attitude‟,8 an attitude that entails that we hold the 
person in question responsible. In cases in which we ascribe praise to someone in this 
sense of the word, we could in principle also blame or resent or pity or display another 
participant reactive attitude toward S for -ing. 
 Now, if the imaginative Cricket captain did not exercise his capacity to train his 
imagination, but nonetheless happens to come up with imaginative field placements, we 
would praise him, so it seems, only in the former sense of the word. But this sense has 
nothing to do with responsibility: we just value the captain‟s imaginative field placements 
and admire him because of that, without holding him responsible for it (we do not blame 
the captain who has done everything he could for not having any imaginative field 
placements). But this means that this example is irrelevant to the issue of how we should 
understand responsible belief. 
 3. Third and finally, if, contrary to what we have suggested, the captain is 
praiseworthy in a deontological sense for his imaginative field placements, without 
having any kind of voluntary control over them, why would we think that all responsible 
believing is like the imaginative acts of a Cricket captain? Surely, if praiseworthy beliefs 
are of that sort, then they provide a poor model for deontological doxastic justification. 
                                               
8
 See Peter F. Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” in Freedom and Resentment and 
Other Essays (London: Methuen & Co: 1974), 1-25. 
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Under that understanding of doxastic justification, the standards of justification would be 
too high and the cost could well be skepticism, since we would then only be justified for 
very few of our beliefs. 
 
IV. Deontological Intuitions and Demonial Deception 
 
In his article, Weatherson discusses the so-called New Evil Demon (NED) problem, not 
in order to solve it, but as a means to show that the deontological intuitions that a play a 
role in New Evil Demon scenarios favour DDP over DDB. The NED problem is usually 
presented as a problem for reliabilist theories of doxastic justification. The thought is that 
I am equally justified in my beliefs as my doxastic counterpart (who has exactly the same 
beliefs as I do, the same memories, the same intuitions and is disposed to reason as I do) 
even though, unlike me, he happens to live in a world governed by an Evil Demon who 
systematically deceives him, and so, for a large part, happens to have no false beliefs. 
Consider Jim Pryor‟s way of thinking about the problem. Assume that there are three 
victims of equal demonial deception A, B, and C. Victim A frequently uses faulty 
reasoning procedures to arrive at her beliefs, and if she were a little more careful she 
could easily see that they are faulty. Victim B also often uses faulty procedures to arrive 
at her beliefs, but the faults in the procedures are the product of bad upbringing and the 
mistakes are so subtle that we cannot reasonably expect B to notice them. Victim C 
hardly ever uses faulty procedures to arrive at her beliefs; in fact she displays the 
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paradigm of good reasoning, but still has mostly false beliefs because she is the victim of 
devilish deception.
9
 
Following Pryor, Weatherson claims that the notion of blameworthiness cannot 
capture the intuition that C is epistemically better than B. If both are blameless, then both 
are equally justified according to DDB. Weatherson‟s solution to Pryor‟s version of the 
New Evil Demon problem is to claim that none of the victims are justified, but that that 
does not preclude us from attributing praise, and in this way we can accommodate for all 
the intuitions playing a role in this scenario. Let us explain. According to Weatherson, A, 
B, and C are all bad evidence collectors: their evidence is misleading evidence. 
Therefore, the beliefs of all these three victims are unjustified. However, there is still an 
important distinction to be made between A and B on the one hand and C on the other, 
viz. that only C is a good evidence processor: she processes her evidential input 
excellently. Thus, C is epistemically praiseworthy in a way that A and B are not. Thus, 
according to Weatherson, the attribution of praise helps us make sense of the difference 
between B and C, since we can say that C is epistemically praiseworthy (though 
unjustified) in having the beliefs that she does in a way that B is not.
10
 
In response to this argument, we should first notice that Weatherson departs from 
his original understanding of doxastic justification in terms of praiseworthiness as 
expressed in DDP (in conjunction with DD). It now seems that one is justified only if 
one‟s evidence is not misleading and whether one‟s evidence is misleading need not be 
                                               
9
 Cf. James Pryor, “Highlights of Recent Epistemology,” The British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science 52.1 (2001), 95-124, here 117. 
10
 Similarly, Weatherson argues that a person who displays the virtue of cosmopolitanism 
is praiseworthy in a way that someone who rather, albeit blamelessly, displays the vice of 
patriotism is not (cf. p. 566). 
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up to oneself. On this alternative understanding of DDP, justification cannot be 
understood in deontological terms only. This means that, strictly speaking, we have to 
revise DDP and DDB as follows: 
 
DDP*: S responsibly (justifiedly) believes that p only if S is praiseworthy for 
believing that p, 
 
and, presumably, 
 
DDB*: S responsibly (justifiedly) believes that p only if S is blameless for 
believing that p. 
 
However, since all of our criticisms in this paper are directed against the view that 
praiseworthiness for believing that p is a necessary condition for responsibly believing 
that p, we can continue to work with DDP and DDB. 
 Now, what about the difference between victims A and B? It seems impossible to 
articulate the difference between them if we only have the concept of praiseworthiness at 
hand, since neither is worthy of praise. Yet, there is a difference between them, namely 
that B is blameless while A is not. So in order to make sense of all the intuitions in this 
scenario, deontology must be not merely about praise, it has to be about blame too. And 
now the question is how we determine when someone is a „good‟ doxastic agent, „good‟ 
such that it is necessary for doxastic justification. We can either draw the boundary, 
between what counts as a good doxastic agent and what does not, high or low, i.e. we can 
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say that only a praiseworthy doxastic agent is a good one, or we can say that a doxastic 
agent need only be blameless to qualify as „good‟. Either way, we will not be able to 
accommodate all the intuitions in the sceptical scenario above. So the ability to meet that 
constraint cannot help us decide between DDP and DDB. So then we may as well bring 
other considerations to bear, such as the virtues of epistemic conservatism, that will 
adjudicate on DDB‟s favour. Further, since we have to leave an intuition unaccounted for 
whatever way we take deontologism, then this is also problematic for Weatherson‟s 
overall solution to the NED problem. For what is left that is advantageous of taking his 
solution?
11
 
 
V. A Contradiction from DDB? 
 
Let us now to a third and final consideration in favour of DDP, as it is formulated by 
Weatherson. Here, the idea is that the conjunction of DDB (in contradistinction from 
DDP), DD, and the plausible premises 
 
A1: It is possible for S to have a justified but false belief that her belief that p is 
justified. (p. 567) 
                                               
11
 Recall that Weatherson‟s motivation for it is that “[a] fairly common response is to 
note that even according to externalist epistemology there will be some favourable 
property that the victim‟s beliefs have, and this can explain the intuition that there is 
something epistemically praiseworthy about the victim‟s beliefs. My approach is a 
version of this, one that is invulnerable to recent criticisms of the move.” (p. 564) 
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A2: If S blamelessly believes that she is justified in believing that p, and on the 
basis of that belief comes to believe that p
12
, then she is blameless in believing 
that p. (p. 568) 
 
leads to the following contradiction: 
 
(1) S justifiedly, but falsely, believes that she is justified in believing that p. 
(A1). 
(2) On the basis of this belief, S comes to believe that p. (Assumption). 
(3) S blamelessly believes that she is justified in believing that p. (1, J=B 
[DDB]) 
(4) S blamelessly believes that p. (2, 3, A2) 
(5) S is justified in believing that p. (4, J=B [DDB]) 
(6) It is false that S is justified in believing that p. (1) (pp. 568-69). 
 
Given that (1) and (6) are logically contradictory, so the argument goes, we have to reject 
DDB (Weatherson‟s J=B), A1, or A2. A2, says Weatherson, “is extremely plausible”, so 
either A1 or DDB has to go. But to give up A1 is to commit oneself to externalism, so if 
                                               
12
 We are not quite sure how to understand this. Does Weatherson mean that S comes to 
believe that p on the basis of thinking (a) that a belief that p is justified, (b) that her belief 
that p would be justified if she were to acquire it, or (c) that the belief that she already has 
is justified? It seems highly doubtful that one can come to believe something one already 
believes, so, for the sake of charity, we take Weatherson to have in mind either (a) or (b). 
We don‟t think anything hangs on which one of the two one takes. 
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we want to be deontologists and internalists we had better give up DDB in favour of 
DDP. 
 Before responding to this argument against DDB, let us first consider whether 
DDP fares any better. On Weatherson‟s proposal, this means that, first, we replace DDB 
by DDP, and second, that we say that the inference from I am justified in believing that p 
to p is itself praiseworthy only if the premise (i.e. that I am justified in believing that p) is 
true. It is not entirely clear what this is supposed to mean (does it mean to say something 
merely about the epistemic status of the inference to p or the epistemic status of the belief 
that p itself?) The idea, however, seems to be that we should replace A2 by A3: 
 
A3: If S is praiseworthy for believing that she is justified in believing that p, and 
on the basis of that belief comes to believe that p, then she is praiseworthy for 
believing that p only if S is justified in believing that p.
13
 
 
Now, what does the „argument‟ on Weatherson‟s alternative look like? He fails to lay it 
out, but it seems that it would look as follows: 
 
(7) S justifiedly, but falsely, believes that she is justified in believing that p. 
(A1). 
(8) On the basis of this belief, S comes to believe that p. (Assumption). 
                                               
13
 In Weatherson‟s own words: “First, we say that a belief‟s being justified is not a matter 
of it being blameless, but a matter of it being in a certain way praiseworthy. Second, we 
say that the inference from I am justified in believing that p to p is not praiseworthy if the 
premise is false.” (Weatherson 2008, 569) 
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(9) S is praiseworthy for believing that she is justified in believing that p. (7, 
J=P [DDP]) 
(10) S is not praiseworthy for believing that p. (8, 9, A3) 
(11) S is not justified in believing that p. (10, J=P [DDP]) 
 (12) It is false that S is justified in believing that p. (7) 
 
And, clearly, there is no contradiction involved in this set of propositions. The problem 
with A3, however, is that it seems trivially true. Given DDP (Weatherson‟s J=P), A3 
could be rephrased as: 
 
A3*: If S is praiseworthy for believing that she is praiseworthy for believing that 
p, and on the basis of that belief comes to believe that p, then she is praiseworthy 
for believing that p only if S is praiseworthy for believing that p. 
 
A3 is true by definition, in the same way as A2* is true by definition: 
 
A2*: If S blamelessly believes that she is blameless for believing that p, and on 
the basis of that belief comes to believe that p, then she is blameless for believing 
that p only if she is blameless for believing that p. 
 
The really important question that Weatherson should have addressed is whether the 
following genuinely informative principle is true: 
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A4: If S is praiseworthy for believing that she is justified in believing that p, and 
on the basis of that belief comes to believe that p, then she is praiseworthy for 
believing that p, 
 
or: 
A4*: If S is praiseworthy for believing that she is praiseworthy for believing that 
p, and on the basis of that belief comes to believe that p, then she is praiseworthy 
for believing that p. 
 
And the problem is that A4/A4* seems equally plausible as A2/A2*. If praiseworthiness 
is transferred from a meta-belief B* to a belief B in virtue of B*‟s being about B in a 
specific way, then why would blamelessness not be transferred from a meta-belief B* to a 
belief B in virtue of B*‟s being similarly about B? Hence, Weatherson‟s reasoning at this 
point fails to favour DDP over DDB. 
 Second, this argument against DDB fails quite simply on the falsity of 
Weatherson‟s assumption that we need to be externalists in order to think that we have 
infallible knowledge about our beliefs about justification, since we could just stipulate an 
internalist condition on top of the infallibility condition. At most, the necessity of having 
infallible beliefs about justification implies a strong form of access internalism according 
to which only reasons that I have special, infallible access to (through introspection) can 
justify for me a belief that p. Further, one need only be committed to the claim that not all 
justified beliefs are true, or that justification does not entail truth, and this is quite 
consistent with thinking that justification entails truth when it comes to propositions 
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about one‟s own reasons. So we have not eschewed the internalist idea that one can have 
justified but false beliefs. Weatherson seems to anticipate this objection: 
 
Now some may think that the general principle [A1; AB & RP] is right, but that 
beliefs about what we are justified in believing are special, and if they are justified 
they are true. But such an exception seems intolerably ad hoc. If we can have false 
but justified beliefs about some things, then presumably we can have false but 
justified beliefs about our evidence, since in principle our evidence could be 
practically anything. So the following situation seems possible; indeed it seems 
likely that something of this form happens frequently in real life. S has a false but 
justified belief that e is part of her evidence. S knows both that anyone with 
evidence e is justified in believing p in the absence of defeaters, and that there are 
no defeaters present. So S comes to believe, quite reasonably, that she is justified 
in believing that p. But S does not have this evidence, and in fact all of her 
evidence points toward ~p. So it is false that she is justified in believing p.” (pp. 
567-68) 
 
Here, Weatherson claims that there are situations in which (a) some person S has a false, 
but justified belief that e is part of her evidence, (b) S knows that anyone with evidence e 
is justified in believing p in the absence of defeaters, (c) S knows that she has no 
defeaters for e (or for believing that p?), (d) S thereby comes to believe that she is 
justified in believing that p, (e) S lacks e, (f) S‟s evidence strongly points toward ~p, and, 
therefore, (g) S is not justified in believing p. Weatherson‟s argument, however, trades on 
the ambiguity of the word „justification‟, which he uses purely deontologically and 
internalistically in (a), (b), and (d), but purely externalistically in (g), or vice versa. If, for 
instance, we interpret „justified‟ in (a), (b), (d), and (g) purely deontologically and 
internalistically, then we see that S‟s belief that she is blameless in believing that p is 
itself not only blameless, but also true. If she had the belief that believing that p is 
justified in some externalist sense of the word, then that belief itself might be false, but 
this possibility is excluded, given that DDB is the thesis under investigation. 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, for all Weatherson shows, there is no reason to prefer DDP to DDB. All 
three arguments against DDB that we considered fail at one or several junctures. 
Moreover, as we have seen in response to the voluntarism problem and the New Evil 
Demon problem, we need to be careful not to set the standards of justification too high if 
we do not want to risk scepticism. DDB seems much better capable of meeting this 
demand than DDP. Together with the other virtues that transfer from EC to DDB and the 
fact that DDB fits much better with plausible analyses of the analogous phenomenon of 
responsible action, this provides us with sufficient reason to adhere to the standard 
account of responsible belief in terms of blamelessness rather than praiseworthiness. 
